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AN UTILITARIAN TEST FOR CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
ANDEFRON WOODS1
No greater confusion appears in any field of thought than in
the effort to draw a line of demarcation between responsibility and
irresponsibility on the part of offenders against the criminal law.
This results, I venture to contend, from the fact that the practical
need giving rise to this distinction has in the course of years been
overlooked. The utilitarian considerations which have thus become
obscured must again be brought to light before a satisfactory criterion
of responsibility can be adopted.
The legitimate social reactions to crime are three: (1) direct
restraint of the offender himself from further misdeeds; (2) moral
education of the offender directed toward his reformation or cure; (3)
punishment, with a view to deterrence from crime, not only of the
particular-offender, but as well of other persons unlawfully disposed.
These three processes may be designated in brief as restraint, cure
and punishment. Each of the three is in some degree present, or
presumably so, in every concrete measure employed by the criminal
law, except the death penalty, which obviously cuts off cure. But
whatever mingling of these there may be, they are theoretically dis-
tinct; and especially is the element of punishment to be kept separate,
in any discussion of the subject of criminal responsibility. Punish-
ment proper has for its primary end deterrence. The inmate of an
asylum is in a sense punished by his confinement, as the deprivation
of his liberty is painful; but the primary purposes thereof are re-
straint and cure, and do not include intimidation. On the other hand.
a law-breaker is not sentenced to prison or to death unless it be held
desirable to deter him and others (or in the case of death others
only), through fear of the prescribed penalty, from similar future
offenses. These latter measures are punishment, and it is only in
reference to such that the question of responsibility arises. Only
the so-called responsible can, under the law, be punished.-
Now, if respon'sibility is punishability, and if the object of punish-
ment is deterrence; then it is impossible to see how the essential
characteristic of responsibility can be anything different from the.
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state of being subject to deterrence from the particular offense through
fear of the penalty prescribed- therefor. This surely seems the only
utilitarian answer to the question. Conversely, he who is not thus
subject to deterrence-he whose intimidability with reference to the
act and its penalty is not sufficient to overcome his impulse to com-
mit the act-is irresponsible.
When punishment is not useful and necessary in the combatting
of evils worse than itself, it is wicked and cruel. Notwithstanding
the confusing influence of certain religious and metaphysical ideas,
this utilitarian principle has always to an extent been recognized.
A common example is the treatment of children in the home. Those
who by a sufficiently advanced mental development are enabled to
understand that a penalty will be repeated if an offense is repeated,
and who can thus be brought to refrain from a harmful act, are
punished; while those who, because of extreme youth or other- cir-
cumstance, cannot reason in this way from cause to effect, are ex-
empted. Likewise, in dealing with the lower animals, while we hesitate
not to inflict pain when useful and necessary, we recognize it as
inhumane to do this when it will produce no proportionate benefit.
By the same reasoning, society has recognized that there are limits
on its moral right to punish offenders against it; and though, as stated,
the subject is much confused, there is prevalent at least a sub-conscious
feeling that punishment should not be imposed in cases where not
useful and necessary in deterrence from wrongdoing.
The fact that the deterrence aimed at is not that of the particular
offender alone, but even more that of other persons similarly inclined,
need not vary our criterion of responsibility. To be controlled by
the fear of punishment, it is necessary only that the duly intimidable
individual recognize himself as a member of the class held legally
responsible. For this purpose, to be sure, the law as to responsibility
requires clarity. The criterion herein proposed lends itself, as I
think will presently be seen, more readily to popular understanding
than do any of the criteria now current.
Proceeding to an examination of the theories on this subject
which now prevail: We find it announced that irresponsibility cannot
exist without mental disease. But what is disease? Nobody limits
it to structural defect of bodily organ. In its practical sense the word
surely covers all bad functioning; and this, when applied to mental
conditions, manifestly includes all criminal inclinations. Recogniz-
ing this, legislators and jurists have usually specified that the disease
must be only such as takes away the knowledge of right and wrong.
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Here again we are at sea; what is the knowledge of right and wrong?
First, taking the phrase in its ordinary sense, i. e., the moral: If to
know that an act is wrong means merely to know that it is condemned
by general opinion, it takes a veritable half-wit not to know that the
most common crimes are so condemned. If it means a real moral
consciousness, then if the perception be strong enough the wrong will
not be done; and, on the other hand, the man without it needs more
than any other the deterrent influence of the penal law.
The discussion at this point may seem in danger of drifting into
the free-will controversy. If space permitted, I should like to argue
that the basic conceptions of freedom and necessity are, in the ultimate,
not incompatible. But no more need be said here than that only in
so far as the will of the evil-disposed is believed subject to external
influence, can there be justification for punishment at all.
Going back to the knowledge of right and wrong: if the words
mean, as has been held by some courts, lawful and unlawful; again
we find a distinction patent to all but extremely low grades of in-
telligence. The fact is that to be deterred by the law a man must
not only know the law; he must fear it, and the fear must be sufficient
to overcome his unlawful impulse.
Now, what connection is there between the non-intimidability
here put forth as the test of irresponsibility, and mental disease? In
the first place, we may, if we choose, regard this abnormal non-
intimidability as itself a manifestation of disease. 'Secondly, there
may be such relation between it and other so-called pathologic in-
dications also present as to render the latter evidentiary of the former.
This question of indirect psychologic evidence may well be one for
the expert, whose assistance may thus become invaluable in a deter-
mination of the degree of intimidability present.
But the condition being one of non-intimidability with reference
to the given act and its penalty, it matters not how such condition
was caused. Whether due to nerve lesion, to bad education (in other
words, bad mental hygiene, producing bad mental functioning), or
to something else, there is present in any event the sine qua non of
irresponsibility.
It is now time to face the inevitable question, how, by this test
of responsibility, can there be any responsible law-breakers at all, and
how do they come to break the law? The answer is also inevitable;
the offense can only be committed because of an uncertainty in the
law's operation with reference to the particular act, with a corres-
ponding doubt in the mind of the offender as to whether he will be
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punished. The logic of this is unescapable: the purpose of the penal
law being to deter, then either the violator must be non-intimidable to
such a degree that the law cannot be expected to deter him, or else
the law has failed to inspire confidence in itself by punishing with
due uniformity similar offenses in the past. If the first alternative
be true, the offender is irresponsible; if the second, then responsible.
To be sure, this criterion of responsibility embodies a reflection
upon the efficiency of the legal machinery. It assumes that where
the offender is responsible the crime is committed because of failures
to arrest, failures to convict, or failures to consummate punishment,
in cases where arrests, convictions and punishments should have been
carried' out. It is indeed imaginable that this proposed admission
of a relative inefficiency on the part of the state, with its suggestion
of a lowering of the commonwealth's dignity, has been the obstacle to
a due consideration of what were otherwise so obviously the utilitarian
test of responsibility. But what of this admission? It is merely
a recognition of a disturbance in the ideal equilibrium between the
criminal impulse and the deterrent force, which equilibrium there
must be an effort to restore. No human institution works perfectly,
and the work of a governing body, like that of any other agency,
must consist largely in a continuous effort to remedy its own short-
comings. The very commission of the crime is itself a clear evidence
of failure on the part of the penal machinery; for is not the design
of that machinery the prevention of crime? Nor will it do to answer
that the fault is all that of the criminal; because it is just such
individuals that the penal law seeks to control. To be sure, every
crime is an arraignment not of the state alone, but of the church,
the school and the home. Yet it is not within the province of the
court to correct defects in these latter institutions. It must confine
itself to its prescribed field, and here it can, and should, aid in making
punishment for the particular crime more certain by punishing the
instant offender if he be a member of the class subject to deterrence
by such means.
Neither may the offender be heard to say that by past penal un-
certainties he has been unfairly misled, and that his punishment should
therefore be remitted. Whatever criterion of responsibility were
adopted, the one held responsible could always complain that society,
had it been good enough and wise enough, would have prevented his
misstep. The question is not one of absolute justice to the individual,
but of social utility.
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Having indicated the substance of the proposed utilitarian test
of responsibility, it is now time to offer some suggestive language, the
like of which might either be embodied in a statute or be made into a
rule of jurisprudence. I accordingly propose the following:
If at the time of committing the act there was present in the
mind of the actor a well-founded hope of escaping the penalty pre-
scribed therefor by law, but for which hope he would not have corn-
mnitted the act, he is to be held responsible; otherwise, irresponsible.
If the foregoing formula is difficult in application, it is less so
than others now current. For the would-be offender who fears the
law, it defines sharply a class of punishable individuals of which
he can readily recognize himself as a member. True, he may never-
theless commit the offense, if after reflecting upon the criterion of
legal responsibility and finding it against him he still hopes that a
breakdown in some other part of the penal machinery will enable
him to escape punishment. But at least* one element of uncertainty-
that relating to the theory upon which the jury will be instructed to
base their decision as to his responsibility-will have been removed.
Something should be said in reference to a possible indefiniteness
in the expression, "the penalty prescribed therefor by law," in view
of the wide discretion allowed judges in imposing sentence. There is
much merit in the view that in all cases a certain amount of punish-
ment, proportioned to the stated offense, should be made sure and
irreducible. A serious question may arise, to be sure, in the case
of a young offender, whose future it is felt may be ruined by ignominy;
but even in such case (assuming responsibility in the sense herein
used) there should be some inescapable deprivation of privilege. On
the other hand, abandonment of the system of indeterminate confine-
ment is not practicable, in view of the claims of restraint and cure
as distinguished from punishment. But it would seem that after
the needs of punishment in the strict sense have been met, such further
detention as an offender may require upon the ground that he is
not fit to be at liberty. is to be imposed as upon an irresponsible rather
than a responsible individual, and so is not to be regarded as penalty
at all. An "habitual criminal," in whom the habit of crime is so deeply
ingrained as to render him insensible to the fear of punishment, is
irresponsible; and while the name of the institution in which he is
kept is unimportant, he should be considered from that time on not
as a subject for punishment but as one to be observed and cared for
by experts in moral psychology.
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The term "penalty" would thus be applied to the irreducible dep-
rivation imposed directly for deterrence, and so would become definite
in meaning. If this distinction is not to be made, no doubt in the
proposed rule the word "minimum" ought to be prefixed to "penalty";
or, if judicial latitude.is not to be limited more than at present, per-
haps the prefix should be "average."
A further criticism of the proposed test may be that the term
"well-founded hope" is not sufficiently explicit. Some elaboration
might be in order, but from this I desist in the interest of brevity,
trusting that the phrase will be given an every-day, practical meaning.
The scope of this essay not permitting an attempt to solve all
the related problems, it is time to leave with the reader the above formula
for a criterion of criminal responsibility; the language of which is
designed only to be suggestive, but the substance of which affords,
as it is humbly claimed, a logical and utilitarian test to be applied in
jurisprudence.
